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Foreign Search and Seizure: The Fourth
Amendment At Large
The Administration's recent policy of "Say No to Drugs" has
sparked a veritable war on drugs within our country. Outside our
borders, on the high seas, and in foreign lands, the war on drugs
has been fought to prevent their entry through our borders. This
"war" is encroaching on the fourth amendment rights of persons
suspected of drug trafficking who are subjected to search and
seizure. This Comment examines the fourth amendment protection
these people have received, and argues that the courts should up-
hold the fourth amendment, rather than pay it verbal service.
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment's 2 applicability outside United States terri-
tory has been examined by several authors with respect to the search
and seizure of American citizens on the high seas.3 These articles,
however, do not consider the recent Ninth Circuit decision in United
States v. Peterson,4 which addressed searches on the high seas. Also,
previous treatments have not addressed the issue of searches in for-
eign countries of either United States citizens or foreign nationals.
Similarly, previous treatments have not addressed the extent to
which evidence obtained in these searches is admissible in a United
States court.
This Comment initially reviews the fourth amendment's applica-
1. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 10, 1988, Prt. 1 at 1, col. 1; Aug. 7, 1988, Prt. V at
3, col. 3.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
3. See Note, High On the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment, and
Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1980); Note, Search and Seizure
of Foreign Vessels on the High Seas, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 227 (1982).
4. 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987).
bility to searches on the high seas as a point of departure for under-
standing Peterson. After a discussion of this case, the Comment next
addresses whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
of evidence, as stated in United States v. Leon,5 should be extended
to foreign searches and seizures. The Comment then examines cur-
rent application of 'the fourth amendment in foreign countries,
whether the subject of the search is a United States citizen or a
foreign national. The issues of joint venture and standing are dis-
cussed at this juncture.
In discussing these issues, this Comment considers whether the
cases are being decided on the merits, or whether a predetermined
disposition to admit the evidence is being justified by manifest con-
siderations. Finally, the Comment highlights implications for the fu-
ture and concludes that the courts should uphold the fourth amend-
ment in this area.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ON THE HIGH SEAS
American Vessels On The High Seas
The constitutional treatment given the random stopping of vessels
on the high seas by government agencies derives its heritage from
the practice of random stopping of automobiles, which has been held
to violate the fourth amendment absent "articulable and reasonable
suspicion" that some violation of the law was engaged in by the mo-
torist.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals extended this rationale
to vessels on the high seas in United States v. Piner,7 with a divided
panel concluding that random stops and safety inspections of Ameri-
can vessels at night, absent reasonable suspicion of noncompliance
with safety ordinances, transgress the fourth amendment. 8
The court's extension of the rationale from land to high seas is
useful because it affords individuals upon the high seas the same pro-
tections they would receive upon land. It is arguable that even more
protection and privacy should be afforded to persons upon the high
seas because of the concept that the high sea is res communis, be-
longing to the individuals using it as opposed to any state.9 Cer-
tainly, no less protection should be afforded.
In contrast to other circuits, however, the Fifth Circuit, in United
5. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
6. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
7. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d
414, 423 (2d Cir. 1981) (requiring reasonable suspicion for seizure of a Panamanian
vessel on the high seas after obtaining permission of the Panamanian government to
board).
8. 608 F.2d at 361.
9. Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 602 F.2d
379, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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States v. Williams,10 declined to extend the rationale from automo-
bile stops to stops of vessels on the high seas. The court, sitting en
banc, rejected the applicability of "land based" fourth amendment
law to seizures upon the high seas, implying that searches and
seizures on the high seas are fundamentally different from those on
land."" The court held that the "reasonable suspicion" standard was
unnecessary under the fourth amendment in stopping American ves-
sels in international waters. 2 Instead, Williams relies on a statutory
approach for its discussion of American vessels, 13 which is less pro-
tective of individual liberties.
Whether the search occurs in customs waters or upon the high
seas determines which statute applies. "High seas" has been defined
to be all waters beyond the territorial seas of the United States and
beyond the territorial seas of any foreign nation.14 The United States
Coast Guard obtains its authorization to stop and board American
vessels on the high seas from 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).1 5 This statute,
which the Fifth Circuit has held to be constitutional," gives the
Coast Guard full power to stop and board any American flag vessel
anywhere on the high seas in the complete absence of suspicion of
criminal activity.17
10. 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d
59, 61 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983 (1980).
11. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1071 n.1., 1081. (A seizure takes place within the
meaning of the fourth amendment by merely stopping and boarding a vessel. Indeed,
stopping a vessel alone without boarding constitutes a seizure under the fourth amend-
ment, as the governmental action restrains the vessel's freedom to proceed).
12. Id. at 1071 n.2, 1081-82.
13. Id. See also infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
14. 21 U.S.C. § 955b(b) (1982); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22-3
(1969); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1979).
15. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982) partially provides that:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United
States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of viola-
tions of the laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, war-
rant, and petty officers may at anytime go on board any vessel subject to the
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law of the United States, address inquir-
ies to those on board, examine, inspect and search the vessel and use all neces-
sary force to compel compliance.
16. United States v. One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.
1976) (per curiam).
17. United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
rev'd in part, affd in part, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956
(1980); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1976).
Foreign Vessels On The High Seas
A different analysis is applied to foreign vessels in international
waters. Williams concluded that section 89(a) provides the Coast
Guard with authority to seize foreign vessels in international waters
only if the Coast Guard first has a reasonable suspicion that those
aboard are engaged in a conspiracy to smuggle contraband into the
United States. 8 The rationale for treating foreign vessels differently
is that only when a reasonable suspicion of trafficking exists does the
Coast Guard have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the vessel
is subject to the operation of American laws. The provisions of sec-
tion 89(a) are only then invoked. 19 This conclusion is consistent with
the international law standard for seizure of foreign vessels in inter-
national waters.2
Foreign nationals are able to raise fourth amendment challenges
in high seas searches by the Coast Guard under the reasoning that
"once aliens become subject to liability under United States law,
they also have a right to benefit from its protection.'
Searches In Customs Waters
United States territorial waters extend three miles from its coast-
line.2 2 "Customs" waters can, however, be extended beyond the nor-
mal limit of one hour sailing time, provided an arrangement exists
between the United States and the foreign country. 3
The Customs Service and Coast Guard obtain authority to board
vessels and conduct searches in customs waters through 19 U.S.C. §
1581(a). 24 This statute is different from the "reasonable suspicion"
standards of Piner for American vessels and the application of sec-
tion 89(a) to foreign vessels. The standard for customs waters
18. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1074. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(0), 1709(c) (1982). This
"reasonable suspicion" standard may be illusory in view of the fact that sections 14010()
and 1709(c) enable customs waters to be extended beyond one hour sailing time if an
arrangement or treaty between the United States and foreign country exists. This sub-
jects the foreign vessel search on the high seas to the customs waters search standard
that "no suspicion" is necessary.
19. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1076.
20. Convention on the High Seas, Article 22, opened for signature April 29,
1958.
21. United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979).
22. United States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674, 677 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982).
23. 19 U.S.C. §§ 14010), 1709(c) (1982).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982) provides:
Any officer of the customs [defined to include Coast Guard officers by 14
U.S.C. § 89(b) (1976) and 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(i), 1709(b) (1976)] may at any
time go on board any vessel . . . at any place . . . within the customs waters
and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, in-
spect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person,
trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such
vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
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searches is even less stringent regardless of the ship's flagship. In
customs waters, whether the vessels are American or foreign, courts
have held that no modicum of suspicion is necessary.2 5
Application of the Fourth Amendment on the High Seas: United
States v. Peterson
The 1987 Ninth Circuit panel decision in United States v. Peter-
son 2 8 is the most recent consideration of the fourth amendment's ap-
plicability on the high seas. In Peterson, the Bangkok office of the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) received a tip that thirty-two tons
of marijuana were to be shipped from Thailand to the West Coast of
the United States. The DEA informed Thai authorities that the sus-
pect was present in Bangkok, whereupon the Thai authorities
wiretapped the suspect's home telephones and a government post of-
fice where a second suspect was believed to be making telephone
calls. The ship departed, and after a stop at Manila, the DEA seized
the ship in Alaska, finding approximately twelve tons of marijuana
on board.
After learning that a second shipment involving the same partici-
pants was headed toward the Philippines, the DEA contacted Philip-
pine authorities. The Philippine Narcotics Command placed under
surveillance a participant who was living in Manila, and monitored
and taped radio transmissions between his apartment and the ship.
The DEA helped decipher the intercepted communications. In addi-
tion, the Philippine government tapped the suspect's telephone and
gave the DEA tapes of the interceptions.2"
The United States Coast Guard intercepted the ship one hundred
miles south of Cabo San Lucas. When the Coast Guard radioed a
request for the ship's registration and identification, the vessel re-
sponded that it was a Panamanian ship which had departed from the
Philippines for Panama.29
After the ship refused to consent to the Coast Guard's request for
25. See, e.g., United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.
1978). But see United States v. Kleinschmidt, 596 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam), reh'g denied, 599 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979)
(holding that the reasonable suspicion standard applies to customs officials' stop of a
vessel).
26. 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987).
27. Id. at 488.
28. Id. at 488-89.
29. Id. at 489.
boarding, the DEA contacted a Panamanian narcotics official and
obtained telephonic approval to search the ship in the name of the
Panamanian government. When the ship was informed that the
Coast Guard was to board, the ship did not stop and its crew set it
on fire. As the Coast Guard attempted to board, the ship rammed
into the Coast Guard vessel and the blazing ship started to sink. The
crew threw some marijuana overboard; however, the Coast Guard
recovered what it could from the deck and the water.3"
The defendants appealed their convictions for possession of a con-
trolled substance in United States customs waters81 with intent to
distribute, and for conspiracy to destroy goods to prevent seizure.
32
They asserted that the marijuana was inadmissible because it was
unlawfully seized, basing their argument on the fact that discovery
of the ship resulted from an unlawful wiretap33 involving participa-
tion by United States officials. The defendants further asserted both
a lack of a warrant and a lack of statutory authority for the Coast
Guard to board, alleging that Panama did not consent.34
In treating these issues, the court acknowledged that neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court had been particularly clear
about the extent to which the fourth amendment applies on the high
seas. 5 However, following other Ninth Circuit decisions,36 the court
assumed that the fourth amendment applied.37 Normally, the fourth
amendment does not apply to searches by foreign authorities in their
own countries, even if the subjects of the search are American. 38 Pe-
terson's major premise is, however, that if participation by United
States agents in the investigation is substantial, then the action may
be considered a "joint venture" between United States and foreign
officials. The joint venture then becomes subject to the reasonable-
ness of the fourth amendment. The minor premise of Peterson holds
that reasonableness under the fourth amendment is to be determined
30. Id.
31. Id. at 493. The Ninth Circuit refers to the high seas search (occurring one-
hundred miles south of Cabo San Lucas) as taking place in customs waters. Given the
joint venture nature of this search, this characterization may be appropriate. See supra
note 18.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); 21 U.S.C. § 955a(c) (1982); 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2232
(1982).
33. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 489. The government did not, but should have argued
that the independent criminal acts of setting the Pacific Star on fire and jettisoning the
cargo were so attenuated from the wiretap that the chain of the taint was broken.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Troise, 796 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Cilley, 785 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
37. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 489.
38. United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Birdsell v.
United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965)).
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by consulting and examining the law of the foreign country.39 This
second premise can be criticized because the court fails to provide
any support or explanation for such an unprecedented action.
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred in conclud-
ing that no joint venture existed: the DEA had assumed a substantial
role because the DEA believed that the marijuana was destined for
the United States.40 After concluding that a joint venture existed,
the appellate court examined the foreign law to determine the import
of the Philippine wiretap. The Philippine Constitution and the Re-
public Act 4200 provide that wiretaps without written judicial au-
thorization are inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, un-
less required by an order for public safety.41 Although the district
court had found no violation of Philippine law, the Ninth Circuit
maintained that, because of the Philippine courts' long history of
construing their constitution in favor of individual liberties,42 the
search did not comply with Philippine law, and therefore, was not
reasonable under the fourth amendment.43
FOREIGN SEARCHES AND THE EXTENSION OF THE GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION To THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Instead of excluding the evidence on this basis, the court in Peter-
son next considered if the evidence could be admitted by applying
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in
United States v. Leon.44 The exclusionary rule was designed to deter
federal officers from violating the fourth amendment and to en-
courage legal conduct. 45 The premise of the good faith exception is
that the exclusionary rule does not deter the conduct of law enforce-
ment officers acting on the reasonable belief that their conduct was
legal. 48 Hence, if officers rely in good faith on a facially valid war-
rant, although the evidence was unlawfully seized, the evidence is
39. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490.
40. Id.
41. PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Republic Act 4200, Phil. Permanent and General
Stat., Trinidad, Ed. (Quezon City 1978).
42. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491 (citing Marcelo v. De Guzman, 114 Phil. Sup. Ct.
Rpts. Ann. 657 (1982)); see also Marcelo, 114 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rpts. Ann. at 664
(Aquino, J., concurring) (holding that evidence seized pursuant to an insufficiently par-
ticular warrant must be excluded).
43. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491.
44. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
45. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968).
46. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19.
not excluded.47
The court in Peterson liberally applied the good faith exception to
protect United States officials from what was feared to be a "strict
liability standard."4 8 Although finding the search to be illegal under
Philippine law and unreasonable under the fourth amendment, the
court held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule ap-
plied to foreign searches, and admitted the evidence.49 Leon, how-
ever, spoke of reliance on facially valid warrants, 50 absent in Peter-
son: United States officials relied only on foreign law enforcement
officers' representations that compliance with their own law had been
met; no written authorization was obtained. 5'
The extension of the good faith exception to foreign searches may
pose potential problems in the future due to a lack of restraint on
foreign officials' conduct. When reliance upon the representations of
foreign officers, who are not available to testify later, is feasible, U.S.
officers may be induced to take procedural shortcuts. Getting a for-
eign official to do what one could not do directly is the type of con-
duct the exclusionary rule seeks to deter. Thus, the Peterson exten-
sion of the good faith exception, from facially valid warrants given
by a neutral magistrate to foreign searches based on the representa-
tions of foreign officers, is a broad leap.
Although a seizure and search may be authorized by statute,
United States v. Ramsey 2 requires the court to make a second in-
quiry: Did the same search violate the Constitution? 53 Similar to the
dual inquiry in personal jurisdiction issues," this approach helps pro-
tect individual liberties, because although authorized by statute, the
search must still comply with constitutional requirements.
Consistent with the Ramsey two-prong inquiry, the court in Peter-
son, after asserting that statutory authority existed for the search,
addressed whether that search violated the fourth amendment. The
court assumed that the fourth amendment applied, while stating that
the point was far from settled, but found probable cause to search
and seize the vessel, resulting in no constitutional invalidity.55
Thus, a predetermined disposition justified by manifest considera-
tions emerges from the court's decision in Peterson: a wiretap search
in violation of the fourth amendment and the law of a foreign coun-
47. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-22.
51. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492.
52. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
53. Id. at 615.
54. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439
F.2d 428, 435 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 494.
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try should be excluded from evidence once the court determines that
a joint venture exists. However, this evidence is now admissible by
extending the good faith exception of the exclusionary rule to foreign
searches.
UNITED STATES CITIZENS ASSERTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN FOREIGN COUNTRY SEARCHES
The fourth amendment has been held to have extraterritorial ap-
plication to a federal agent's conduct abroad against United States
citizens. 6 When the search and seizure is no longer on American
soil or in United States customs waters, but takes place in a foreign
country, justification is necessary to admit evidence into a United
States court when no overt act or crime was committed within
United States territory. United States v. Bowman57 provides the jus-
tification: the government has the right to defend itself against
crimes perpetrated by its own citizens wherever the crimes may be
committed. If the locus of the act was limited to the site where the
individual would be subject to territorial jurisdiction, United States
citizens would be immunized in foreign countries. 8
The Concept of Joint Venture Applied To Foreign Searches
Parallel to Peterson and its joint venture requirement upon the
high seas, fourth amendment protections are afforded to American
citizens only when a joint venture is found to be present between the
United States and a foreign government. 9 The problem with the
joint venture concept is that it is particularly susceptible to result-
oriented factual determinations - determinations which run counter
to the spirit of the fourth amendment. The court need only find that
no joint venture exists between the two governments; the fourth
56. Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (Ist Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 939 (1951).
57. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
58. "But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes
which are ... not logically dependent on their locality for the government's jurisdiction,
but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruc-
tion, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens ....
[T]o limit [the] locus [of an offense] to ... territorial jurisdiction would ... greatly
curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for
frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at
home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in
the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to
be inferred from the nature of the offense." Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
59. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 743.
amendment then becomes inapplicable and the evidence becomes ad-
missible. For example, in Brulay v. United States,s0 the court found
no joint venture when United States customs agents alerted Mexican
federal police to the activities of an American citizen in Mexico, al-
though their advisement clearly facilitated his arrest. Even though
the Mexican police had no warrant, 297 pounds of amphetamine
tablets found in his car and 1,908 pounds found in a Tijuana house
were seized and admitted into evidence in a United States federal
court."' Fourth amendment interpretations, such as in Brulay, pro-
tect individuals less when this type of involvement is considered in-
sufficient to constitute a joint venture. Indeed, the exclusionary rule's
goal of deterring conduct in violation of the fourth amendment is
frustrated when courts sanction United States agents' conduct. This
provides the necessary inducement for foreign officers to act illegally.
A concern should exist about an additional method by which the
fourth amendment may be unduly circumvented in foreign searches.
The opportunity now exists for courts to apply Peterson's generous
holding and extend the good faith exception of the exclusionary rule
to foreign searches, thereby decreasing needed constitutional
protections.
Stonehill v. United States
The Ninth Circuit developed the joint venture doctrine in
Stonehill v. United States.2 In Stonehill, the defendants, American
citizens living in the Philippines, had business records seized and ad-
mitted into a civil action brought by the United States, which sought
foreclosure of federal tax liens against the taxpayers. On appeal, the
taxpayers asserted that the district court erred in denying their mo-
tion to suppress because the seizure by foreign officials violated their
fourth amendment rights and because the conduct of the United
States agents constituted "participation" in the illegal searches and
seizures.6 3
The Ninth Circuit found that the fourth amendment did not apply
because all activities of the United States agents apparently took
place before the raids began, or after their termination.64 Before the
raids, United States agents took part in selecting the places to be
60. 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Benedict, 647 F.2d
928, 931 (9th Cir. 1981). No joint venture was found between Thai police and the DEA
in investigating the activities of an American citizen residing in Bangkok. Although DEA
agents accompanied the Thai police during the search (which was held to violate the
United States Constitution), their role was said to be passive. As a result of the search,
150 grams of heroin were admitted into evidence.
61. Brulay, 383 F.2d at 348.
62. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968).
63. Id. at 740.
64. Id. at 746.
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searched and the items to be seized. United States agents examined
records, differentiated significant from insignificant material for
seizure, and consulted and advised the foreign government in the
searches. 65 However, because the United States agents copied the
documents with the Philippine government's permission after the
raids were completed, no joint venture was found. 6
The Philippine Supreme Court, relying on a section of the Philip-
pine Constitution identical to the fourth amendment, held that the
raids were illegal searches and seizures; if these same raids had been
conducted by United States agents, they would have been improper
under the United States Constitution.
6 7
However, the Ninth Circuit in Stonehill, developing its rationale
from Brulay, found that the exclusionary rule should not apply to
the acts of foreign officials. The court, in fleshing out the concept of
joint venture, provided its rationale for holding the exclusionary rule
inapplicable to the acts of foreign officials:
1) All relevant evidence is admissible unless there is an exclusion-
ary rule;
2) The fourth amendment does not by itself provide for exclusion
of unlawfully obtained evidence;
3) In order to compel United States officers to abide by the fourth
amendment, the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule;
4) There is nothing our courts can do to require foreign officers to
abide by our Constitution.68
Thus, the fourth amendment applies to raids by foreign officials
only if federal agents so substantially participate in the raids that a
joint venture is formed between the United States and foreign offi-
cials.6 9 Hence, the exclusionary rule will only apply with the partici-
pation of United States officials.
The United States-foreign nation joint venture analysis derives
from a similar joint venture analysis between federal and state offi-
cials prior to the decisions in Mapp v. Ohio"° and Elkins v. United
States,'7 1 which incorporated the fourth amendment into the four-
65. Id. at 751.
66. Id. at 743, 746.
67. Id. at 743.
68. Id.
69. Id. See generally Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1948); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926); Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.
1949); Sloane v. United States, 47 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931).
70. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
71. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
teenth amendment. 2
Prior to this incorporation, courts employed the "silver platter"
doctrine in their federal-state analysis. Under this doctrine, if state
officials did the seizing and handed the evidence over to federal offi-
cials on a "silver platter," evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment would be admissible unless the purpose of the
search was to obtain evidence for a federal offense, or if federal of-
ficers participated in the search.7 3 "Substantial participation" was
the key for finding that a joint venture existed, and this carried over
into the United States-foreign nation analysis.7'
Borrowing from the federal-state counterpart of Byars v. United
States,7 1 the court in Stonehill held that mere participation by a
federal agent is insufficient to constitute a joint venture; instead, the
effect must be as though the agent engaged in the undertaking as
one exclusively the agent's own. 8 Whether the search is framed as a
joint venture is determined by comparing what the federal agent did
with the totality of the acts comprising the search and seizure.
77
The Byars-Lustig Rule
Lustig v. United States8 affirmed the Byars principle upon which
Stonehill relied, but found a joint venture between federal and state
agents when a Secret Service Agent reported suspicions of the de-
fendant's counterfeiting to local police. The court stated, "[S]o long
as [the officer] was in it before the object of the search was com-
pletely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in
it.179 Lustig went on to hold that to differentiate between participa-
tion from the beginning and joining a search before it had run its
course would be drawing too fine a line in applying the Byars
doctrine.80
The significance of the Lustig holding is its demonstration of how
courts can massage the joint venture concept to achieve a predeter-
mined disposition. Although, as the court stated in Stonehill, a
"thorough examination of the facts of each case" is required by By-
ars to determine the question of substantial participation,81 if the
court wants a particular outcome, the joint venture concept can be
framed in such a way that the desired outcome is ensured. Similar
72. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657; Elkins, 363 U.S. at 215.
73. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Lustig, 338 U.S. at 79.
74. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 743.
75. 273 U.S. 28 (1926).
76. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 744 (citing Byars, 273 U.S. at 32-33).
77. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 744.
78. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
79. Id. at 79.
80. Id.
81. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 745; see Byars, 273 U.S. at 32.
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sets of facts may or may not give rise to the conclusion that a joint
venture existed. For example, in Birdsell v. United States,8 2 an
American was arrested in Mexico by Mexican officials. The Birdsell
facts are similar to those of Lustig- an American police officer gave
information leading to the arrest and search, and assisted Mexican
authorities by acting as an interpreter.8 3 The court found no joint
venture here,84 where the Lustig court would have found one. A foot-
note in Birdsell stated that if federal officials induced foreign police
to engage in conduct which shocked the conscience, then a federal
court might refuse to allow the prosecution to enjoy the fruits of that
action.85 However, the Lustig court did not require the federal offi-
cial's conduct to shock the conscience, but only that the agent's par-
ticipation occurred before the search was completed.
A federal agent must not be permitted to do indirectly that which
he cannot do directly: circumvent the fourth amendment."6 Further-
more, the Lustig criterion holds that as long as the officer was in-
volved before the search was completed he was a participant.8"
Therefore, the base qualifications for a joint venture should be very
broad. Accordingly, courts should be slow to come to the conclusion
that a joint venture doesn't exist, leaving that conclusion only for the
narrowest of circumstances where the United States had no involve-
ment of any kind before, during, or immediately after the search. If
any assistance to the foreign government was given, then in the in-
terest of protecting an invaluable constitutional right, a joint venture
should be found.
The dissent in Stonehill develops these themes. In his persuasive
dissent, Judge Browning emphasized that the evidence obtained by
the searches and seizures flagrantly violated a Philippine constitu-
tional provision, identical to our fourth amendment, which required
that a warrant contain language describing with particularity the
items to be seized. 8 The Supreme Court of the Philippines had
stated that, "[tjo uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
82. 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
83. Id. at 782.
84. Id.
85. Id. n.10 (emphasis added).
86. Sloane, 47 F.2d at 890.
87. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
88. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 747 (Browning, J., dissenting); Phil. Const. art. III §
1(3).
guaranteed in our Constitution."89
The dissent points out that the majority misapplied the "silver
platter" doctrine.90 According to the majority, evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment would be admissible unless fed-
eral participation in the search was so substantial that it constituted
a "joint venture" between the governments. 1 The dissent aptly ob-
serves that the majority's holding is that federal officials may partici-
pate in searches and seizures that violate the fourth amendment as
long as they don't participate "too much."
92
The majority relied on Byars, which states that the fourth amend-
ment applies when the search was a joint operation. 93 According to
the dissent, however, this language refers to the facts in Byars only,
rather than setting forth a general rule for all fourth amendment
cases.94 Actually, the sole issue in Lustig was the interpretation and
application of Byars. 5 As the Lustig court states:
The crux of [the Byars] doctrine is that a search is ... by a federal official
if he had a hand in it .... The decisive factor . . . is the actuality of a
share by a federal officer in the total enterprise of securing and selecting
evidence by other than sanctioned means.98
Hence, Lustig's liberal construction lends itself to increased findings
of joint ventures. Lustig made no reference to the concept of joint
operation,97 but emphasized the percentage role the agent played.
Justice Frankfurter explained later that under the "silver platter"
doctrine, the "question has always been whether the offending search
or seizure was conducted in any part by federal officers or in the
interest of the Federal Government .. ."8 This supports the con-
tention that a joint venture can be found without the agent having a
literal hand in the search. If the federal government has an interest
in the search, then the fourth amendment should become applicable
through the finding of a joint venture.
It has been suggested that the reluctant and stingy administration
of the Byars-Lustig rule by some lower courts imposed upon the vic-
tims of searches and seizures impossible evidentary burdens (burdens
which would be even more formidable in a foreign search), and
89. Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rpts. Ann. 383, 392 (1967).
90. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 748 (Browning, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 744 (citing with approval Byars, 273 U.S. at 33).
94. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 748 (Browning, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Lustig, 338 U.S. at 78-79 (emphasis added).
97. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 749. (Browning J., dissenting).
98. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 236 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added); see also Euziere v. United States, 266 F.2d 88, 90 (10th Cir.
1959) stating, "The test in all cases is 'did the federal authorities participate in any way
in the search?'"
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tempted federal and state officials to collude.99 The ultimate result of
this concern was reflected in Elkins v. United States, which held
that evidence unconstitutionally seized by state officers must be ex-
cluded from federal prosecutions even if federal officials did not par-
ticipate in any way in the search and seizure.100 Because the United
States-foreign nation joint venture concept has followed the direction
of its federal-state counterpart thus far, with policy considerations
being equally applicable, courts should apply the same rule to for-
eign searches and exclude all evidence unconstitutionally seized by
foreign officers, even if United States federal agents did not partici-
pate in the least. At the very least, evidence should be excluded
where the foreign official's conduct "shocks the conscience."
The dissent in Stonehill emphasizes that because the fourth
amendment applies only to United States officers, the focus should
be on their actions.10 1 The majority's own summary of the facts
shows definite United States involvement. In stating that American
agents were involved in events preceding and following the initial
physical intrusion upon the searched premises, the majority uses a
highly restrictive characterization of the term "raid."'1 2 An officer's
actions can be more easily viewed as participatory if the search is
seen as a functional process, (rather than merely related to a physi-
cal process) which is incomplete until appropriation of the seized ob-
jects is made for introduction into a court of law.103 In viewing the
officer's participation in a search in terms of its functional whole,
activities taking place before or after the raids can be seen as "sub-
stantial participation," necessitating the invocation of the fourth
amendment.1
0 4
FOREIGN NATIONALS ASSERTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
FOREIGN COUNTRY SEARCHES
Recently, courts have been faced with cases in which foreign na-
tionals have attempted to assert the fourth amendment and other
constitutional rights. The foreign nationals claim that those rights
were violated in a foreign country through the efforts of a joint ven-
ture between the United States and a foreign government, with the
99. Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State
and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1165-96 (1959).
100. Elkins, 364 U.S. 206.
101. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 749 (Browning, J. dissenting).
102. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 751.
103. Id.
104. Id.
seized evidence ultimately being used in a United States proceeding.
The Constitution's protection of foreign nationals from the con-
duct of United States officers abroad has never been delineated. An
initial consideration with regard to the extent of protection afforded
is the degree to which the interest asserted by the foreign national is
congruous with the intended scope of the constitutional provision.105
The issue first arose in 1974 in United States v. Toscanino,'0° in
which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the fourth
amendment limits that conduct of United States officers abroad
which affects foreign nationals. Toscanino, an Italian citizen, ap-
pealed his conviction of conspiracy to import narcotics.107 A hearing
was granted after the defendant asserted that he was kidnapped
from Uruguay by a member of the Uruguayan police who was acting
ultra vires, in that he was accepting payment from the United States
government. 08 Toscanino alleged that he was later tortured in Brazil
and drugged before being put on a plane to the United States.108
Aside from claimed violations of treaties to which the United
States was a party,"l0 Toscanino alleged that there had never been a
formal or informal request by the United States government to ex-
tradite him from Uruguay and that the Uruguayan government had
no prior knowledge of his kidnapping."' He further alleged that the
prosecutor, a United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York, was aware of Toscanino's interrogation and that a member of
the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, was present and participated in some of the inter-
rogations." 2 In response to these allegations, the government prose-
cutor did not affirm or deny them, instead claiming that they were
immaterial to the district court's power to proceed."1
3
An illegal arrest constitutes a seizure of the person, violating his
105. See United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1978). Here,
United States' participation was seen as substantial, requiring a finding of joint venture
between United States and Mexican authorities. Statements made by an American under
interrogation and arrest in Mexico were subject to suppression for failure of Mexican
authorities to administer Miranda warnings. Because Miranda safeguards "should not be
circumvented merely because the interrogation was conducted by foreign officials in a
foreign count[r]y. . .", it follows that in similar situations, the fourth amendment should
not be refrained from being upheld because the search takes place in a foreign country
by foreign officials.
106. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
107. Id. at 280.
108. Id. at 269.
109. Id. at 270.
110. These treaties included the O.A.S. Charter, art. 17; U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
para. 4.
111. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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or her fourth amendment rights." 4 The government asserted in Tos-
canino that fourth amendment protections afforded to American citi-
zens did not extend to foreign nationals."1  The court, however, em-
phasized that the fourth amendment protects "people" rather than
"areas ' ' 116 or "citizens ' ' 17 and stated that "[t]he Constitution of the
United States is in force . . . whenever and wherever the sovereign
power of that government is exerted." 118 Because a foreign national
may assert the fourth amendment against searches occurring in the
United States," 9 the court found "no sound basis . . [for] a differ-
ent rule with respect to aliens who are the victims of unconstitutional
action[s] abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit the
fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against the
alien in the United States."' 20 The concurrence by Judge Anderson
suggested that the Bill of Rights need not be extended to foreign
nationals;121 instead, he proposed that the same result could be
achieved by deciding the case on due process grounds alone. 22
Since Toscanino, the issue has recurred only a handful of times.
However, the results of these cases disclose that the modern judicial
trend can be characterized as permitting foreign nationals, who are
victims of unconstitutional governmental conduct abroad, to assert
constitutional protections when the United States government tries
to use the product of their illegal conduct in a criminal
prosecution. 23
FOREIGN NATIONALS ASSERTING STANDING IN AMERICAN COURTS
Within the issue of whether the fourth amendment applies to the
foreign search of a foreign national conducted as a joint venture be-
tween two governments is the issue of standing. This issue was first
114. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-88 (1958); see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures,
34 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1921).
115. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280.
116. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
117. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280.
118. Id. (citing Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1921)).
119. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280 (citing Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration
and Naturalization Serv. 335 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971)).
120. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280.
121. Id. at 281. (Anderson, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 973 (11th Cir. 1984), affd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
addressed in Cardenas v. Smith. 24 A Colombian citizen filed suit
against the Attorney General when her Swiss bank account was
seized under a treaty between the American and Swiss governments
which provided for mutual assistance in gaining information and evi-
dence needed for criminal proceedings. 25 Cardenas was not under
investigation or indictment, but charges were pending against her
brother for allegedly violating United States narcotics laws.1 26
The district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment, stating that it had "no basis for attempting to apply con-
stitutional standards on behalf of a nonresident alien with respect to
a res which is not subject to the court's control.' 127 1 However, in ad-
dressing the issue of whether a nonresident alien has standing to as-
sert a constitutional claim, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia (D.C. Circuit) pointed out that Cardenas' status as a for-
eign national did not alter the fact that she suffered from an injury
in fact, sufficient to invoke standing under Article III, and that it is
the injury, not the party, that determines standing. 2 8 Whether she is
Colombian or American, she has a personal stake that would be af-
fected by the outcome of the controversy. 129 Further, the injury is no
less of an injury just because it occurred abroad. 30
Although the trend of the earlier cases was to hold otherwise,'
3 '
"the decisions over the years disclose a definite trend to relax the
rigidities of earlier cases.' 32 For example, the Ninth Circuit re-
cently held that Australian residents have standing to raise objec-
tions under the United States Constitution to limitations on liability
imposed by the Warsaw Convention. 3 One court has said that, even
abroad, conduct of American officials must be measured by the Con-
stitution.' Additionally, the D.C. Circuit assumed without deciding
that an alien could constitutionally challenge American actions in
the United States that led to his arrest in Germany by German offi-
cials, stating, "the extent to which the Constitution's protections
124. 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
125. Id. at 911; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Con-
federation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1973).
126. Cardenas, 733 F.2d at 911.
127. Id. at 912. See Cardenas v. Smith, 555 F. Supp. 539 (D.D.C. 1982).
128. Id. at 913.
129. Id.; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489
(1983).
130. Cardenas, 733 F.2d at 913; see, e.g., Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267; Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1956).
131. See Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835
(1960).
132. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 309 F.2d
647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
133. In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 n.6
(9th Cir. 1982).
134. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (Ct. for Berlin 1979).
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shield aliens from actions which occur in other countries is not
clear . . . Much may depend on the status of the individual com-
plaining and the action complained of.' 1 5
United States v. Verdugo
A recent opinion develops the reasoning of these recent cases and
continues the judicial trend toward extension of fourth amendment
protections to foreign nationals. United States v. Verdugo36 involved
the search of two residences of Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican na-
tional and suspect in the kidnap and murder of DEA agent Enrique
Camarena Salazar. Verdugo was a case of first impression in the
Ninth Circuit, which had never dealt with the issue of foreign
searches of foreign nationals.1
37
After Verdugo's arrest138 on narcotics offenses, both DEA agents
and Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) conducted a thorough
search of his two homes in Mexico.' 3 9 The DEA agent who made the
decision to conduct the searches had participated in "hundreds" of
previous searches in Mexico, and although none of the evidence had
been admitted into a United States court, this was his objective in
the instant case."4 0 Although obtaining authorization from the
MFJP, the agent did not contact the United States Attorney or De-
partment of Justice for authorization or for a determination of the
legality of the proposed searches."' Although all the seized weapons
were kept by the MFJP, all other materials were turned over to the
DEA, which brought them into the United States without either pre-
paring an inventory or leaving a receipt for items that had been
seized."
The District Court found that a joint venture between the United
States and Mexican government existed because the sole purpose of
the search was to aid the pending prosecution in the United States
135. Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 769, 773 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
136. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 86-0107-JLI-Crim, slip op. at 3
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1987).
137. Verdugo, slip op. at 10. Previous cases in the circuit involved searches of U.S.
citizens.
138. United States agents admitted to paying six Mexicans to abduct Verdugo. He
was blindfolded and stuffed into the back of a car and pushed through a hole in the
border fence where United States Marshals were waiting to arrest him. Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 21, 1987 at 1, col. 4.
139. Verdugo, slip op. at 2-4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 8.
and because Mexico had no similar interest or pending prosecu-
tion.143 Reasoning that it was unlikely that the fourth amendment
was not intended to protect a foreign national facing criminal
charges in United States custody, the court held that the fourth
amendment applied to the searches irrespective of citizenship.144
The searches were conducted without a Mexican or United States
warrant and the government demonstrated no exigent circumstances
for circumventing this requirement. 5 The district court has the con-
stitutional power, notwithstanding Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 41(a), to issue overseas warrants. This power does not infringe
upon the sovereignty of the foreign nation if the joint venture search
is authorized by foreign officials prior to the warrant's execution. 14
Because the DEA agents failed to obtain a warrant, the court held
the search to be unconstitutional. The court explained that there was
no meaningful way to distinguish between the fourth amendment's
overseas application to a United States citizen and to a foreign na-
tional in custody. 47 Despite the government's request, the court de-
clined to extend the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to
foreign searches, as the Ninth Circuit later did in Peterson.148 Even
if the exception was extended, the Verdugo court held that the DEA
agent's belief in the legality of the searches was unreasonable under
the Leon standard. 49
Finally, the searches were held to be unreasonable even if the lack
of a warrant was excusable. The government demonstrated no exi-
gent circumstances to justify the searches taking place at night15
Compounded by the lack of inventory, receipts, and lack of a written
or verbal description of the items to be seized, the search was de-
clared by the district court to be an unconstitutional general search,
justifying suppression of the evidence .
51
The United States appealed the District Court's ruling and a
panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding that
the fourth amendment protected Verdugo, a foreign national, stating
that the evidence was properly suppressed.1 52 The Ninth Circuit
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 15-16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a), provides that, "A search warrant au-
thorized by this rule may be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge of a state court of
record within the district wherein the property or person subject to seizure is located,
upon request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government."
147. Verdugo, slip op. at 18.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 19.
150. Id. (citing United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1981)).
151. Verdugo, slip op. at 20.
152. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 88 Los Angeles Daily J. D. Apt. Rep.
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based its reasoning on the principle that the Constitution limits gov-
ernmental authority to act abroad.153 The court rejected the dissent's
"compact theory" in the context of the Constitution's extraterritorial
application, whereby Verdugo would not be entitled to fourth
amendment protections as a foreign national who was not a party to
the compact between the federal government and "The People" of
the United States. 5 Instead, the court adopted a "natural rights"
approach 55 and observed that because the fourth amendment pro-
tects an alien whose presence in the United States is voluntary but
illegal, denying protection to Verdugo whose presence in the United
States is legal but involuntary could not be justified. 5 '
Verdugo demonstrates the better rule for foreign and even high
seas searches. The case is significant for two reasons: it asserts the
fourth amendments's applicability to foreign nationals and protects
the foreign national. In the same spirit as Lustig and the Stonehill
dissent, these views are viable because they help distill the clouded
fourth amendment issues and set a clear example for judges and at-
torneys to follow in the future. These cases take the fourth amend-
ment beyond the verbal patronage that it has received from other
courts, and actually provide fourth amendment safeguards.
CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment's applicability to American and foreign
citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries is in a state of
evolution, making it ripe for Supreme Court adjudication. A concern
should exist for what appears to be the courts' paradoxical tendency
to extend the fourth amendment's applicability while at the same
time neglecting to protect the individual with its safeguards. The
most readily ascertainable means, but the means least consistent
with protecting constitutional liberties, is to extend the good faith
exception to foreign searches or find that no joint venture exists, as
the courts in Peterson and Stonehill respectively held.
However, our government is entirely a creature of the Constitu-
tion, bound to respect the limitations that the Constitution imposes
on its powers, whether it acts at home or abroad. 57 Lustig, the
11122 (Aug. 31, 1988). Due to the timing of this decision's issuance and this case note's
publication, full analysis of the case must be postponed.
153. Id. at 11124.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 11125.
156. Id. at 11126-27.
157. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
Stonehill dissent, and Verdugo, which support a more strict constitu-
tional interpretation, provide the most desirable benchmark for other
courts to follow in upholding fourth amendment protections: deny
the admissibility of evidence when fourth amendment requirements
have not been met during foreign searches and seizures. The case
law appears to be slowly following this trend, at least in respect to
more courts recognizing the rights of aliens to invoke constitutional
protection. Ideally, the trend will catch on with respect to our own
citizens, as their nexus to the Constitution is closer. In this manner,
predictability and stability in the application of our Constitution
may be reestablished. Likely to flow from this is a positive perception
of our government and an increased respect for its laws which may
promote adjustments in people's conduct to conform to consistent ju-
dicial standards.
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